

European Hydrogen Safety Panel (EHSP)

Statistics, lessons learnt and recommendations from the analysis of HIAD 2.0 database

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Introduction

This presentation follows that of Pietro Moretto (JRC) about HIAD


It will also refers to the following document covered in the presentation by

Dr. Elena Vyazmina

Chapter 3 of "Safety planning and management in EU hydrogen and fuel cells projects - guidance document", EHSP, 21 September 2021. <u>https://www.fch.europa.eu/page/european-hydrogen-safety-panel</u>



Overview of the data collection and assessment process






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The methodology



https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/wp- content/uploads/2014/08/European-scale-of-incidents.pdf)



Human consequences (fatalities, injured with hospitalisation, slightly injured)

Economic consequences (property damage or economic cost)

Nature: Explosion, fire, unignited release, near miss



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Two groups of cause categories

System design, material, manufacturing, and installation

Job factors, individual/human factors, and safety management system factors



Recommendations (based on EHSP safety principles

https://www.fch.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Safety_Planning_for_Hydrogen_and_Fuel_Cell_Projects_Release1p31_2019 0705.pdf)







Results from the statistics analysis (1)

The analysis reported here is based on the 706 incidents, which were in the database as of May 2021.

Years




Industrial sectors







Results from the statistics analysis (2)









Results from the statistics analysis (3)

Operational mode



Causes (multiple entries per incident possible)





The lessons learned are grouped into the following four main categories:

- <u>کې</u>.
- System design
- System manufacturing, installation, and modification
- Human factors
- Emergency response






Lessons learnt in relation to cascading effects

James Reason's Swiss Cheese theory https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swiss_cheese_model

Cascading effects of minor events could result in extremely serious consequences





Example (Event ID477) of cascading effects

- Prosecutor's report on Gangeung Hydrogen Tank Explosion Accident, May 2019, South Korea
- The following text is adapted from the English translation by INERIS about the contributing factors:
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- Oxygen removing component omitted in the system ...
- Buffer tank static spark remover was omitted during construction...
- Operator made fault by running water electrolysis system lower than operation power level, which induced increase of O₂ concentration...
- The O_2 concentration was detected as > 3%, which required O_2 detector and remover. However, the operator ignored this issue and continued operation to reach 1000 hours of required experiment validation time.
- Safety management team did not follow safety regulation to daily test hydrogen quality.








Lessons learnt related to human factor

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- Lack of regular maintenance or inspection, special attention for safety devices during maintenance
- Reoperation after repair
- Individual/human factors, lack of clear instructions
- Reusing tanks or pipes previously containing flammable liquid or gas without thorough purging




Definition of Health and Safety Executive (HSE)






Statistics related to EHSP identified safety principles (SP#)











Structure of recommendations at a glance

Table 3: Structure of the recommendations at a glance

	Operational mode		
Recommendations	Industrial sectors	Hydrogen energy	H ₂ transport and
			distribution
			H ₂ powered vehicles
			Laboratory / R&D
			Power generation
		Other industrial sectors	Nuclear
			Aerospace
			Chemical/petrochemical
	Human factors		



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Recommendations for different operational modes

Adequate training of personnel is key (SP9) - training of new personnel as well as periodic updated training of existing personnel.



Both passive and active safety measures should be appropriately considered (SP7, SP8).



Leak detection (SP4) and ATEX zoning (SP3, SP5) should be applied to improve safety.



Regular inspection and maintenance.



When operational/equipment changes are made, the maintenance/inspection should also be updated accordingly.



https://eta-safety.lbl.gov/content/integrated-safety-management-ism






Recommendations for hydrogen energy applications – system design

Perform Process Hazard Analysis for any new/updated installations (SP1-10);



Use materials which are compatible with hydrogen services. In some incidents, such problem resulted in the need to change standards and codes for pressure vessels (SP0);

Install adequate leak detection and mitigation barriers (SP4, SP8) for critical systems.







THANK YOU!



The report from the analysis can be found at

https://www.fch.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Lessons%20learnt%20from%20HIAD%202. 0-Final.pdf

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A paper based on the analysis was presented at the International Conference on Hydrog

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A modified version of the above paper has been published in the International Journal of Hydrogen Energy in Gold Open Access. It can be downloaded free at the following link:

https://reader.elsevier.com/reader/sd/pii/S0360319922012976?token=B67B5AC502387E7B7CE7CC15 DABAE2731A101F1BEF7D7A2DEDBF4B0DE060A2CD430485A0C110D758A00ADE1D884ADF5D&ori ginRegion=eu-west-1&originCreation=20220414145607



